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1 Introduction
In a seminal paper [7], Dow and Werlang dealt with the basic portfolio prob-
lem under uncertainty. They proved that for an uncertainty averse Choquet
expected utility decision maker (CEU DM), endowed with a convex capacity 푣
and a 퐶2 concave increasing utility function 푢, there exists an interval of prices
[퐼(푋), −퐼(−푋)] within which this agent neither buys nor sells short some shares
of an asset 푋. The hightest price at which the agent will buy the asset is the ex-
pected value of the asset under 푣 (i.e. the Choquet integral of 푋, 퐼(푋)) whereas
the lowest price at which the DM sells the asset is the expected value of sell-
ing the asset short (i.e. −퐼(−푋)). Such a behavior is intuitively plausible and
compatible with observed investment behavior. It contrasts with the prediction
of expected utility theory under risk (see von Neumann and Morgenstern [16]),
according to which a strongly risk averse agent (i.e. with a concave utility func-
tion) or equivalently a weakly risk averse agent (a result due to Rothschild and
Stiglitz [13]) will invest in an asset 푋 if and only if the expected value of this
asset exceeds the price, and will wish to sell the asset short if and only if the
expected value is lower than its price and consequently will have no position in
the asset if and only if the price is exactly 퐸(푋) (see Arrow [4]).
In "Portfolio inertia under ambiguity" [5], Asano studied the portfolio inertia
phenomenon in the context of ambiguity. His model consists of an investor who
is a CEU maximizer and a quadruple (푆, 풜, 푝, 푢) where 푆 is a set, 풜 a 휆-system,
푝 a probability on 풜 and 푢 a concave increasing function (the utility function of
the DM). The beliefs of the investor are captured through the inner measure 푝풜
defined for all 퐵 ∈ 2푆, by 푝풜(퐵) = 푆푢푝 {푝(퐴) ∣ 퐴 ∈ 풜, 퐴 ⊂ 퐵} . In this con-
text, he shows that the no-trade interval phenomenon persists. More precisely,
he shows that
(∫
푋(푠)푝풜(푑푠),−
∫
(−푋(푠))푝풜(푑푠)
)
is a no-trade interval. It is to
be noted that the inner measure 푝풜, while still super-additive1, is not necessarily
convex. In fact, Asano shows that all super-additive capacities exhibit portfolio
inertia and therefore that convexity is not necessary.
In the present paper, we show that super-additivity at certainty2 is the weakest
possible condition for the existence of portfolio inertia. More precisely, we show
that for a CEU investor whose beliefs are captured through a capacity 푣 and
whose preferences are given by a 퐶1 increasing utility function 푢, the existence of
the no-trade interval is equivalent to super-additivity at certainty of the capacity
and concavity of the utility function.
We further generalize Dow and Werlang’s result by allowing for negative prices
or equally we prove that the no-trade interval result is robust when considering
assets which can yield non-positive outcomes.
We furthermore make precise the weak uncertainty aversion behavior of the agent,
characteristic of the existence of such an interval, by proving that super-additivity
at certainty of the capacity and concavity of the utility function are also equivalent
to attraction by perfect hedging and preference for comonotone diversification.
Note that similar results had already been proved by Chateauneuf and Tallon
1i.e. for all 퐴, 퐵 ∈ 2푆 such that 퐴 ∩퐵 = ∅, 푝풜(퐴 ∪퐵) ≥ 푝풜(퐴) + 푝풜(퐵)
2푣 super-additive at certainty means that 푣(퐴) + 푣(퐴푐) ≤ 1 for all event 퐴
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in [6] where they showed that for a CEU DM, preference for comonotone diver-
sification is equivalent to the concavity of the utility function. Our proof that
super-additivity at certainty of the capacity and concavity of the utility function
implies attraction by perfect hedging and that, conversely, attraction by perfect
hedging implies super-addtivity at certainty of the capacity is inspired by a paper
of Abouda and Chateauneuf [3] where, however, the context is that of risk for a
RDEU agent.
Finally, we show that for a CEU DM endowed with an increasing utility func-
tion, the existence of the no-trade interval is equivalent both to aversion to some
specific increase of uncertainty and to subjective increasing risk.
2 Definitions and notations
2.1 Elementary definitions of decision making under uncertainty
The distinction between risk (situations where there exists an objective proba-
bility distribution, known by the DM) and uncertainty (situations where there
is no objective probability distribution, or it is unknown to the DM) is due to
Knight [10].
Under (non-probabilized) uncertainty, a decision is a mapping, called act, from
the set of states (of nature) Ω into the set of outcomes ℝ.
Exactly one state is the "true state", the other states are not true. A DM is
uncertain about which state of nature is true and has not any influence on the
truth of the states.
Let (Ω,풜) be a measurable space, ℬ∞ be the set of 풜-measurable bounded map-
pings from Ω to ℝ corresponding to all possible decisions and 푋 ∈ ℬ∞.
We will denote ≿ the preference relation of the DM on the set of all acts ℬ∞.
For any pair of acts 푋, 푌, 푋 ≿ 푌 will read 푋 is (weakly) preferred to 푌 by the
DM, 푋 ≻ 푌 means that 푋 is strictly preferred to 푌 , and 푋 ∼ 푌 means that 푋
and 푌 are considered as equivalent by the DM.
As usual, for all 푋, 푌 ∈ ℬ∞, we write: 푋 ≻ 푌 if 푋 ≿ 푌 and not 푌 ≿ 푋; 푋 ≲ 푌
if 푌 ≿ 푋; 푋 ≺ 푌 if 푌 ≻ 푋; 푋 ∼ 푌 if 푋 ≿ 푌 and 푌 ≿ 푋.
Definition 2.1 A function 푉 : ℬ∞ → ℝ represents ≿ if
푋 ≿ 푌 ⇔ 푉 (푋) ≥ 푉 (푌 ) 푓표푟 푎푙푙 푋, 푌 ∈ ℬ∞.
2.2 The Choquet integral and CEU model
In the CEU model a certain class of set functions (capacities) is used in order
3
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to represent the preference relation. We now define them and give some of their
properties that will be used in the remainder of the article.
Definition 2.2 푣 is a (normalized) capacity on (Ω,풜) if 푣 : 풜 → [0, 1] is such
that 푣(∅) = 0, 푣(Ω) = 1 and ∀퐴, 퐵 ∈ 풜, 퐴 ⊂ 퐵 ⇒ 푣(퐴) ≤ 푣(퐵).
Definition 2.3 Let 푣 be a capacity on (Ω,풜), 푣 is convex if ∀퐴, 퐵 ∈ 풜,
푣(퐴 ∪퐵) + 푣(퐴 ∩퐵) ≥ 푣(퐴) + 푣(퐵).
Definition 2.4 The Choquet integral of 푋 ∈ ℬ∞ with respect to the capacity 푣
is 퐼(푋) =
∫
푋푑푣 where
∫
푋푑푣 =
∫ 0
−∞ (푣(푋 ≥ 푡)− 1) 푑푡+
∫ +∞
0
푣(푋 ≥ 푡)푑푡.
Definition 2.5 푋, 푌 ∈ ℬ∞ are comonotone if ∀푠, 푡 ∈ Ω,
(푋(푠)−푋(푡)) (푌 (푠)− 푌 (푡)) ≥ 0 (i.e. 푋 and 푌 vary in the same direction).
Definition 2.6 The core of a capacity 푣 is defined by
퐶(푣) = {(푓푖푛푖푡푒푙푦 푎푑푑푖푡푖푣푒) 푝푟표푏푎푏푖푙푖푡푖푒푠 푃 : 푃 (퐴) ≥ 푣(퐴) ∀퐴 ∈ 풜} .
Definition 2.7 We say that a DM satisfies the CEU model if his (her) prefer-
ences can be represented through an increasing utility function 푢 : ℝ→ ℝ and a
capacity 푣 on (Ω,풜) which models his (her) personal evaluation of the likelihood
of events. The representation of his (her) preferences is given by
퐼 ∘ 푢 : 푋 ∈ ℬ∞ 7→
∫
Ω
(푢 ∘푋) 푑푣.
In the CEU model, preferences depend on the one hand on a utility function
(which reflects the perception of wealth) and on the other hand on a capacity
(reflecting the perception of the occurrence of events). This preferences repre-
sentation is attractive for at least two reasons: it better represents real choices
and allows for a separation between attitude towards uncertainty and attitude
towards wealth.
Note that the two attitudes are mixed in the expected utility model, where they
are both represented by the utility function.
Note also that, under risk, similar models are proposed by Kahneman and Tver-
sky [9], Quiggin [12], and Yaari [19]. These models are known under the denom-
ination of rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU).
3 Models and results
The study is focused on the case of uncertainty, that is on non-probabilized risk
Choquet expected utility model (Schmeidler [15]). Preferences are then repre-
sented by the Choquet integral of a utility function 푢 with respect to a capacity
푣.
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3.1 The result of Dow and Werlang
We now present the model and result of Dow and Werlang [7].
They consider a measurable space (Ω,풜), a convex capacity 푣 on 풜 and a utility
function 푢 assumed to be 퐶2 and such that 푢′ > 0 and 푢′′ ≤ 0.
Under these assumptions, they obtain the following result about the behavior
of the "risk averse" or "risk neutral" agent under uncertainty aversion (i.e. 푣
convex).
Theorem 3.1 (Dow and Werlang) A risk averse (resp. risk neutral) investor
with certain wealth 푊 > 0, who is faced with an asset which yields a present value
푋 per unit, whose price is 푝 > 0 per unit, will buy the asset if 푝 < 퐼(푋) (resp.
푝 ≤ 퐼(푋)). He (she) will sell the asset if 푝 > −퐼(−푋) (resp. 푝 ≥ −퐼(−푋)).
Remark 3.2 Let us recall that in the EU model, it is well-known that the DM
being "risk averse" (resp. "risk neutral") is equivalent to the utility function being
concave (resp. affine).
Theorem 3.1 is very intuitive and offers an appealing interpretation of the uncer-
tainty aversion in terms of pessimism since, according to a well-known theorem
of Schmeidler [14] which says that 푣 is convex if and only if 퐶(푣) ∕= ∅ and
퐼(푋) = 푀푖푛푃∈퐶(푣) 퐸푃 [푋], the agent views as possible the set of probabilities
above the convex capacity 푣 and will evaluate all assets 푋 by 푀푖푛푃∈퐶(푣) 퐸푃 [푋].
So, when the price 푝 is less than 퐼(푋), the DM will buy a strictly positive amount
of 푋 since he (she) considers that the price is lower than the worst expected value
of 푋.
Conversely, when the price 푝 is greater than −퐼(−푋), the DM will sell short a
strictly positive amount of 푋 since he (she) considers that the price is greater
than 푀푎푥푃∈퐶(푣) 퐸푃 [푋] i.e. than the best expected value of 푋.
Thus, he (she) will have no position on the asset 푋 if and only if its price 푝 is
between 퐼(푋) and −퐼(−푋).
The intuition behind this finding may be grasped in the following example given
by Mukerji and Tallon [11]:
Consider an asset that pays off 1 in state L and 3 in state H and assume that the
DM is of the CEU type with capacity 푣(퐿) = 0.3 and 푣(퐻) = 0.4 and linear utility
function. The expected payoff (that is, the Choquet integral) of buying a unit of
the risky asset is given by 퐼(푋) = 1+(3−1)×푣(퐻) = 1+2×0.4 = 1.8. The payoff
from going short on a unit of the risky asset is 퐼(−푋) = 2×(푣(퐿)−1)+1×(0−1)
= 2 × (−0.7) − 1 = −2.4. Hence, if the price of the asset 푋 lies in the interval
[1.8; 2.4], then the investor would strictly prefer a zero position to either going
short or buying.
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3.2 Generalization and extension of the result of Dow and Werlang
Let (Ω,풜) be a measurable space such that 풜 contains at least one non-trivial
event. Let ℬ∞ be the set of bounded 풜-measurable mappings from Ω to ℝ. We
consider a CEU DM with a 퐶1 utility function 푢 : ℝ→ ℝ such that 푢′ > 0 and
a capacity 푣 on 풜 which is non trivial in the sense that there exists at least one
event 퐴 ∈ 풜 such that 0 < 푣(퐴) < 1.
Remark 3.3 Note that Dow and Werlang only considered assets for which nat-
ural reservation prices 퐼(푋) and −퐼(−푋) are positive, and so they limit their
study to the natural case where the price 푝 by unit is positive; furthermore since
they also assume that the investor is endowed with an initial deterministic positive
wealth 푊, any infinitesimal buying transaction is feasible. In this paper, we show
the robustness of Dow and Werlang’s result when the above restrictions on 푋 and
푊 are relaxed. For instance in situation of insurance, an insurer would face the
losses 푋 of a potential insuree, and indeed since 푋 < 0 such an insurer would
agree to cover (a fraction of) the losses only if the price 푝 of 푋 is negative. In
other terms, we aim at showing that Dow and Werlang’s result would also allow
to determine the minimum premium that an insurer would agree to receive from
an insuree. Similarly, for a negative initial wealth, we can also address the ques-
tion of determining whether the DM would buy the asset at a negative price or
whether he (she) intends to sell short at a positive price. Consequently from now
on, we will assume that the DM is endowed with an initial wealth not necessarily
positive and an asset giving not necessarily positive monetary outcomes.
In this paper, we will exclude the possibility for the DM to borrow any amount of
money in order to avoid intricacies linked with the interest rates. The study of
the situation where the DM is allowed to borrow is postponed to a further paper.
Accordingly the trading situations which are excluded are those where the DM is
endowed with a non-positive initial wealth and either the unit price 푝 of 푋 is
positive, and he (she) intends to buy some shares of the asset or the unit price is
negative and he (she) intends to sell short.
Any situation other than those where 푊 ≤ 0 and either 푝 > 0 and the DM intends
to buy some shares of the asset or 푝 < 0 and the DM intends to take a short position
will be called a situation of feasible trade.
We therefore obtain the following generalization of Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.4 The two following assertions are equivalent:
(푎) For any 푋 ∈ ℬ∞, 퐼(푋) ≤ −퐼(−푋). Furthermore, in any situation of
feasible trade the DM has no position in the asset 푋 on the range of prices
[퐼(푋),−퐼(−푋)], and he (she) buys a positive amount of the asset 푋 at prices
below 퐼(푋), and holds a short position at prices higher than −퐼(−푋).
(푏)
{
(1) 푣(퐴) + 푣(퐴푐) ≤ 1 푓표푟 푎푙푙 퐴 푖푛 풜.
(2) 푢 푖푠 푐표푛푐푎푣푒.
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Note that in contrast with Theorem 3.1, we obtain an equivalence between the
two conditions, which furthermore is valid under weaker conditions. Indeed, we
only require that 푣 be super-additive at certainty i.e. 푣(퐴) + 푣(퐴푐) ≤ 1 for all 퐴
in 풜 instead of being convex and that 푢 be 퐶1 instead of being 퐶2, and this even
when non-positive prices are considered.
As an illustration of Theorem 3.4, one notices that a CEU insurer satisfying
condition (푏) of Theorem 3.4 i.e. weak uncertainty averse in a sense which will
be made precise below, will agree to insure a potential insuree faced with losses
푋 < 0 if and only if the premium is greater than −퐼(푋).
We now make precise the weak uncertainty aversion behavior, characteristic of
the existence of such an interval.
3.3 Uncertainty aversion behavior
Theorem 3.4 can be intrepreted in terms of the attitude of the DM towards
uncertainty. More precisely, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 3.5 A CEU DM will exhibit the no-transaction interval in the sense
of Theorem 3.4 (푎) if and only if:
(3) He (she) is attracted by perfect hedging
(i.e. [푋, 푌 ∈ ℬ∞, 푋 ≿ 푌, 훼 ∈ [0, 1], 훼푋 + (1− 훼)푌 = 푎1Ω 푎 ∈ ℝ]⇒ 푎1Ω ≿ 푌 ).
and
(4) He (she) exhibits preference for comonotone diversification
(i.e. 푋, 푌 ∈ ℬ∞, 푋 푎푛푑 푌 푐표푚표푛표푡표푛푒, 푋 ∼ 푌 ⇒ 훼푋 + (1 − 훼)푌 ≿ 푌 ∀훼 ∈
[0, 1]).
Note that at least three equivalent definitions of perfect hedging might be given
(see for instance Proposition 3.6 in Abouda [1]).3
Remark 3.7 1) Preference for perfect hedging means that if the DM can attain
certainty by a convex combination of two assets, then he (she) prefers certainty
to one of these assets, which is one of the mildest requirements for uncertainty
aversion, so we can also call it attraction for certainty.
3
Proposition 3.6 (Abouda [1]): The following assertions are equivalent:
(i) [푋,푌 ∈ ℬ∞, 훼 ∈ [0, 1], 훼푋 + (1− 훼)푌 = 푎1Ω, 푎 ∈ ℝ]⇒ 푎1Ω ≿ 푋 표푟 푎1Ω ≿ 푌.
(ii) [푋,푌 ∈ ℬ∞, 푋 ≿ 푌, 훼 ∈ [0, 1], 훼푋 + (1− 훼)푌 = 푎1Ω, 푎 ∈ ℝ]⇒ 푎1Ω ≿ 푌.
(iii) [푋,푌 ∈ ℬ∞, 푋 ∼ 푌, 훼 ∈ [0, 1], 훼푋 + (1− 훼)푌 = 푎1Ω, 푎 ∈ ℝ]⇒ 푎1Ω ≿ 푌.
Note that the implications (푖) ⇒ (푖푖) ⇒ (푖푖푖) are obvious while in order to prove that (푖푖푖) ⇒ (푖), we use the
natural fact that for all 푋, 푌 ∈ ℬ∞, 휆 ≥ 0 if 푋 ≿ 푌 then 푋 + 휆 ≿ 푌.
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2) Comonotone diversification is nothing but convexity of preferences restricted
to comonotone random variables (see Schmeidler [15]), it is therefore a kind of
uncertainty aversion. Note that any hedging (in the sense of Wakker [18]) is
prohibited in this diversification operation. This type of diversification turns out
to be equivalent, in the CEU model, to the concavity of 푢.
In [3], Abouda and Chateauneuf considered the problem of attraction by perfect
hedging in the context of the RDEU model. In this model, the beliefs of the DM
are represented by a distortion of probability 푣 = 푓 ∘ 푃, where the distortion
function 푓 : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is assumed to be continuous, increasing and such that
푓(0) = 0 and 푓(1) = 1. The preferences of the DM are represented via a strictly
increasing continuous utility function 푢: the DM weakly prefers 푋 to 푌 if and
only if 퐼(푢(푋)) ≥ 퐼(푢(푌 )), where 퐼 is the Choquet integral. They show that if 푢 is
assumed to be concave and 퐶1, then attraction by perfect hedging is equivalent
to 푓 satisfying 푓(푝) + 푓(1 − 푝) ≤ 1 for all 푝 ∈ [0, 1]. Note that this property
implies that 푣 is super-additive at certainty. Since the class of capacities which
are super-additive at certainty contains many interesting examples which are not
distortions of probability, it seems desirable to extend the result of Abouda and
Chateauneuf to that class. This is what we show in Theorem 3.5 where we prove
that super-additivity at certainty is the only relevant property. Indeed, we show in
that theorem that attraction by perfect hedging is equivalent to super-additivity
at certainty of the capacity and concavity of the utility function.
3.4 Aversion to increasing uncertainty and subjective increasing risk
Definition 3.8 A CEU DM is symmetrical monotone uncertainty averse (SMUA)
if for all 푋, 푌 ∈ ℬ∞, 푋 ≿푠푚 푌 ⇒ 푋 ≿ 푌 where 푋 ≿푠푚 푌 means that there
exists 푍 ∈ ℬ∞, 푍 comonotone with 푋 such that 퐼(푍) = 퐼(−푍) and 푌 = 푋 + 푍.
푌 represents a monotone symmetrical increase of uncertainty in relation to 푋.
So, a DM is symmetrical monotone uncertainty averse if he (she) doesn’t like the
monotone symmetrical increase of uncertainty i.e. if he (she) always prefers 푋 to
푌.
A similar notion of monotone symmetrical risk aversion was already defined by
Abouda and Chateauneuf [3] for a RDEU agent.
A RDEU agent is said to be symmetrical monotone risk averse (SMRA) if for all
푋, 푌 ∈ ℬ∞, 푋 ≿푆푀 푌 ⇒ 푋 ≿ 푌 where 푋 ≿푆푀 푌 means that there exists
푍 ∈ ℬ∞, 푍 comonotone with 푋 such that 퐸(푍) = 0, 푍 =푑 −푍 and 푌 =푑 푋 +푍
(where 푋 =푑 푌 means that 푋 has the same probability distribution as 푌 ).
To illustrate the symmetrical monotone risk order, take the example given in [2]
where a typical symmetrical monotone increase in risk is obtained by adding to
an asset 푌 a comonotone asset 푍 of probability law 퐿(푍) = (−휖, 푝; 0, 1−2푝; 휖, 푝)
where 휖 > 0 and 0 ≤ 푝 ≤ 1
2
.
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Indeed, consider the following example:
Let 푋, 푌 be two assets with probability laws:
퐿(푋) = (3000, 4
9
; 5000, 4
9
; 6000, 1
9
) and 퐿(푌 ) = (0, 1
9
; 2000, 3
9
; 5000, 1
9
, 6000, 3
9
, 9000, 1
9
).
Therefore 푋 ≿푆푀 푌 since 푌 =푑 푋+푍 for some 푍 comonotone with 푋 such that
푍 =푑 −푍 and of probability law: 퐿(푍) = (−3000, 19 ; −1000, 39 ; 0, 19 , 1000, 39 , 3000, 19).
푌 is obtained from 푋 through two simple symmetrical spreads: 푌 =푑 푋+푍1 +푍2
where 퐿(푍1) = (−2000, 19 ; 0, 79 ; 2000, 19) and 퐿(푍2) = (−1000, 49 ; 0, 19 ; 1000, 49).
Note that in the previous definition, the condition 퐼(푍) = 퐼(−푍) is equivalent to
퐸(푍) = 0 when 푣 is a probability measure.
We now introduce a notion of aversion to subjective increasing risk which is
nothing else in the particular case of real outcomes than the one introduced by
Ghirardato and Marinacci in [8] p. 877.
Definition 3.9 Let 퐴, 퐵 ∈ 풜 and 푥1, 푥2, 푦1, 푦2 ∈ ℝ such that 푥1 ≤ 푥2 and
푦1 ≤ 푦2. We say that 푌 = 푦11퐵푐 + 푦21퐵 is a binary subjective mean-preserving
spread (SMPS) of the binary act 푋 = 푥11퐴푐 + 푥21퐴 if 푦1 ≤ 푥1, 푥2 ≤ 푦2,
푣(퐴) = 푣(퐵) and 푦1(1− 푣(퐵)) + 푦2푣(퐵) = 푥1(1− 푣(퐴)) + 푥2푣(퐴).
Definition 3.10 A CEU DM is averse to binary SMPSs if he (she) prefers a
binary act to every one of its binary SMPSs.
Theorem 3.11 Let a CEU DM be endowed with a 퐶1 increasing utility mapping
푢 : ℝ → ℝ and a non trivial capacity 푣 on 풜, then the two following assertions
are equivalent:
(1)
{
(푎) 푇ℎ푒 퐷푀 푖푠 푆푀푈퐴.
(푏) 푇ℎ푒 퐷푀 푖푠 푎푣푒푟푠푒 푡표 푏푖푛푎푟푦 푆푀푃푆.
(2)
{
(푎) 푣(퐴) + 푣(퐴푐) ≤ 1 푓표푟 푎푙푙 퐴 푖푛 풜.
(푏) 푢 푖푠 푐표푛푐푎푣푒.
4 Concluding comments
After recalling the pioneering result of Dow and Werlang on the no-trade interval
of a CEU DM, we generalize this result by allowing for negative prices while
merely weakening convexity of the capacity into super-additivity at certainty.
We also prove that a DM will exhibit this no-trade interval if and only if he (she)
is attracted by perfect hedging and has preference for comonotone diversification
or equivalently if he (she) presents some kind of uncertainty aversion. Finally,
we show that for a CEU DM endowed with an increasing utility function, the
existence of the no-trade interval is equivalent both to aversion to some specific
9
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increase of uncertainty and to subjective increasing risk. We generalize the result
of Dow and Werlang, who restricted themselves to the case of positive initial
wealth and prices, by allowing for non-positivity. Our goal was achieved under
the assumption that borrowing was excluded. We intend in a future study to
examine the robustness of our results when this restriction is removed.
5 Appendix
We now give two technical lemmas which will be useful in the sequel:
Lemma 5.1 Let 푌 ∈ ℬ∞, 푢 : ℝ→ ℝ be a 퐶1 increasing function and let
푔 : 훼 ∈ ℝ→ 푔(훼) = 퐼(푢(푊 + 훼푌 )) ∀푊 ∈ ℝ. Then, 푔 is differentiable from the
right at 0 and
푔′+(0) = 푢
′(푊 )퐼(푌 ).
Proof :
Let 훼 > 0, from the mean value theorem, there exists 푡 ∈ [0, 1]Ω such that
푢(푊 + 훼푌 )− 푢(푊 )
훼
= 푢′(푊 + 푡훼푌 )푌.
It follows from positive homogeneity and constant additivity of the Choquet in-
tegral that
푔(훼)− 푔(0)
훼
=
∫
Ω
푢′(푊 + 푡훼푌 )푌 푑푣.
Note that 푊 + 푡훼푌 converges to 푊 in ℬ∞ when 훼 goes to zero. Hence since 푢′ is
continuous and 푌 is fixed, 푢′(푊+푡훼푌 )푌 converges to 푢′(푊 )푌 in ℬ∞ when 훼 ↓ 0.
Since 퐼 is norm-continuous on ℬ∞,
∫
Ω
푢′(푊+푡훼푌 )푌 푑푣 converges to
∫
Ω
푢′(푊 )푌 푑푣
when 훼 ↓ 0.
Now, since 푢′(푊 ) ≥ 0 and ∫
Ω
푢′(푊 )푌 푑푣 = 푢′(푊 )
∫
Ω
푌 푑푣,
푔′+(0) = 푢
′(푊 )퐼(푌 ).
⊓⊔
Lemma 5.2 Let 푊 ∈ ℝ, 푌 ∈ ℬ∞ and 푢 : ℝ → ℝ an increasing 퐶1 concave
utility function. If 훼 ≥ 0 and 퐼(푌 ) ≤ 0 then 푊 + 훼푌 ≲ 푊.
Proof :
Suppose that 훼 > 0 and 퐼(푌 ) ≤ 0. Then 훼퐼(푌 ) ≤ 0 and so 푊 + 훼퐼(푌 ) ≤ 푊.
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By comonotonicity, 퐼 (푊 + 훼푌 ) ≤ 푊 and since 푢 is increasing,
푢 (퐼 (푊 + 훼푌 )) ≤ 푢(푊 ).
Now, since 푢 is concave and increasing, Jensen’s inequality for capacities (proved
by Asano [5] Theorem 4 p. 231) can by applied, giving:
퐼 (푢 (푊 + 훼푌 )) ≤ 푢 (퐼 (푊 + 훼푌 ))
and so
퐼 (푢 (푊 + 훼푌 )) ≤ 푢(푊 ) = 퐼(푢(푊 )) 푖.푒. 푊 + 훼푌 ≲ 푊.
⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 3.4:
First we show that (푏) implies (푎) :
★ Let us prove that (푏) (1) implies that for all 푋 ∈ ℬ∞, 퐼(푋) ≤ −퐼(−푋).
Let 푋 ∈ ℬ∞, then
퐼(푋) =
∫ 0
−∞
(푣 (푋 ≥ 푡)− 1) 푑푡+
∫ +∞
0
푣 (푋 ≥ 푡) 푑푡.
Note that since 푡 7→ 푣(푋 ≤ 푡) is non-decreasing the set of its discontinuities is at
most countable.
Therefore, for 푎 < 푏,
∫ 푏
푎
푣(푋 ≤ 푡)푑푡 = ∫ 푏
푎
푣(푋 < 푡)푑푡.
Thus,
퐼(−푋) = ∫ 0−∞ (푣 (푋 ≤ −푡)− 1) 푑푡+ ∫ +∞0 푣 (푋 ≤ −푡) 푑푡
=
∫ 0
−∞ (푣 (푋 < −푡)− 1) 푑푡+
∫ +∞
0
푣 (푋 < −푡) 푑푡
= − ∫ 0
+∞ (푣 (푋 < 푡)− 1) 푑푡−
∫ −∞
0
푣 (푋 < 푡) 푑푡
=
∫ 0
−∞ 푣 (푋 < 푡) 푑푡+
∫ +∞
0
(푣 (푋 < 푡)− 1) 푑푡
And so,
퐼(푋) + 퐼(−푋) = ∫ℝ (푣 (푋 < 푡) + 푣 (푋 ≥ 푡)− 1) 푑푡
≤ 0 (푠푖푛푐푒 푏푦 ℎ푦푝표푡ℎ푒푠푖푠 푣(퐴) + 푣(퐴푐) ≤ 1 푓표푟 푎푙푙 퐴 푖푛 풜)
i.e. 퐼(푋) ≤ −퐼(−푋).
★ We now turn to the no-trade interval result.
Indeed all the proofs below make sense only in the case of feasible trades, and
consequently are valid as stated in Theorem 3.4, only in these cases.
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Let us first prove that if 푝 ≥ 퐼(푋), the investor is at least as well off not holding
the asset, as buying any positive amount 훼.
- Note that for any 푝, buying any positive amount 훼 of the asset leads to the
uncertain future wealth 푊 (훼) = 푊 + 훼(푋 − 푝).
The formula is clearly true if 푝 = 0.
If 푝 > 0, buying a positive amount 훼 of the asset at price 푝 requires an amount
of money 훼푝 > 0, hence 푊 (훼) = 푊 − 훼푝+ 훼푋 = 푊 + 훼(푋 − 푝).
If 푝 < 0, buying 훼푋 yields a gain equal to −훼푝, so 푊 (훼) = 푊 −훼푝+훼푋, hence
푊 (훼) = 푊 + 훼(푋 − 푝).
In order to show that the investor prefers not to buy, it is then enough to see
that 푊 +훼(푋 − 푝) ≲ 푊 if 훼 > 0, but this results directly from Lemma 5.2 since
퐼(푋 − 푝) = 퐼(푋)− 푝 ≤ 0.
Let us now prove that if 푝 ≤ −퐼(−푋), the investor is at least as well off not
selling short the asset, as selling short any positive amount 훼.
- Note that for any 푝, selling short any positive amount 훼 of the asset leads to
the uncertain future wealth 푊˜ (훼) = 푊 + 훼(−푋 + 푝).
The formula is clearly true if 푝 = 0.
If 푝 > 0, selling short 훼푋 yields a gain equal to 훼푝, so 푊˜ (훼) = 푊 +훼푝+훼(−푋),
hence 푊˜ (훼) = 푊 + 훼(−푋 + 푝).
If 푝 < 0, selling short a positive amount 훼 of the asset at price 푝 requires an
amount of money −훼푝 > 0, hence 푊˜ (훼) = 푊 + 훼푝− 훼푋 = 푊 + 훼(푝−푋).
In order to show that the investor prefers not to sell short, it is then enough to
see that 푊 +훼(푝−푋) ≲ 푊 if 훼 > 0, but this results from Lemma 5.2, by setting
푌 = 푝−푋; actually 퐼(푌 ) = 푝+ 퐼(−푋) ≤ 0.
It remains to prove that if 푝 < 퐼(푋) the DM will hold a positive amount 훼 of the
asset and that if 푝 > −퐼(−푋), he (she) will hold a short position 훼 > 0.
Assume now that 푝 < 퐼(푋). We only need to show that 푊 (훼) ≻ 푊 (0) = 푊 for
some 훼 > 0 or equally that 푔(훼) = 퐼 (푢 (푊 + 훼 (푋 − 푝))) > 푔(0) for some 훼 > 0.
From Lemma 5.1, 푔′+(0) = 푢′(푊 )퐼(푋 − 푝) hence 푔′+(0) > 0, which completes the
proof.
Finally let 푝 > −퐼(−푋). We only need to show that 푊˜ (훼) ≻ 푊˜ (0) = 푊 for
some 훼 > 0 or equally that 푔(훼) = 퐼 (푢 (푊 + 훼 (푝−푋))) > 푔(0) for some 훼 > 0.
From Lemma 5.1, 푔′+(0) = 푢′(푊 )퐼(푝−푋) hence 푔′+(0) > 0, which completes the
proof.
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We now prove that (푎) implies (푏) :
★ If 퐼(푋) + 퐼(−푋) ≤ 0 for all 푋 in ℬ∞ then 푣(퐴) + 푣(퐴푐) ≤ 1 for all 퐴 in 풜.
Indeed:
Let 퐴 ∈ 풜 and 푋 = 1퐴.
퐼(푋) =
∫
Ω
푋푑푣 = 푣(푋 = 1) = 푣(퐴).
퐼(−푋) = −1 + 푣(푋 = 0) = −1 + 푣(퐴푐).
But since 퐼(푋) + 퐼(−푋) ≤ 0 by hypothesis, 푣(퐴) + 푣(퐴푐) ≤ 1.
★ 푢 is concave. Indeed:
Let 퐴 ∈ 풜 such that 0 < 푣(퐴) < 1, 푥, 푦 ∈ ℝ such that 푥 < 푦 and set
푋 = 푥1퐴푐 + 푦1퐴 and 푡 = 푣(퐴).
Then,
퐼(푋) = 푥+ (푦 − 푥)푡 = 푡푦 + (1− 푡)푥.
Let 푊 = 푝 = 퐼(푋) = 푡푦 + (1 − 푡)푥 and 훼 = 1. Note that since 푊 = 푝, we
are in a situation of feasible trade, so that according to (푎), 푝 = 퐼(푋) implies
푊 + 훼(푋 − 푝) ≲ 푊
푖.푒. 퐼 (푢 (푊 +푋 − 푝)) ≤ 푢(푊 )
and since 푊 = 푝 = 푡푦 + (1− 푡)푥,
퐼(푢(푋)) ≤ 푢(푡푦 + (1− 푡)푥).
On the other hand, since 푢 is increasing, and therefore 푢(푥) < 푢(푦),
퐼(푢(푋)) = 푢(푥) + (푢(푦)− 푢(푥))푡.
Finally,
푢(푥) + (푢(푦)− 푢(푥))푡 ≤ 푢(푡푦 + (1− 푡)푥)
푖.푒. 푡푢(푦) + (1− 푡)푢(푥) ≤ 푢(푡푦 + (1− 푡)푥).
From this, we conclude that 푢 is concave by a result due to Hardy, Littlewood and
Polya (see Wakker [17]) which states that it is enough for a continuous function
to satisfy the concavity inequality for one 푡 ∈ (0, 1) in order to be concave.
⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 3.5:
By Theorem 3.4, it is enough to prove that (푏) is equivalent to (3) and (4).
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Chateauneuf and Tallon [6] showed that for a CEU DM, preference for comono-
tone diversification is equivalent to the concavity of the utility function i.e. that
conditions (2) and (4) are equivalent. The proof that (1) and (2) ⇒ (3) and
(3)⇒ (1) is inspired by a paper of Abouda and Chateauneuf [3] where a similar
result is proved under risk for a RDEU agent.
★ First we show that (1) and (2) implies (3) (cf. Abouda and Chateauneuf [3]
Theorem 3.8 (iii) ⇒ (v)):
Let 푋, 푌 ∈ ℬ∞, 푋 ≿ 푌, and 훼 ∈ [0, 1] such that 훼푋 + (1− 훼)푌 = 푎1Ω, 푎 ∈ ℝ.
We want to prove that 푎1Ω ≿ 푌 i.e. 푢(푎) ≥ 퐼(푢(푌 )).
Since 푢 is concave and increasing, Jensen’s inequality implies hat
퐼(푢(푋)) ≤ 푢(퐼(푋))
and
퐼(푢(푌 )) ≤ 푢(퐼(푌 )).
Furthermore, since 푋 ≿ 푌 , 퐼(푢(푌 )) ≤ 퐼(푢(푋)).
Consequently, 퐼(푢(푌 )) ≤푀푖푛(푢(퐼(푋)), 푢(퐼(푌 ))) (∗).
Now, if 퐼(푋) ≥ 퐼(푌 ) (resp. 퐼(푌 ) ≥ 퐼(푋)) then 퐼(푎1Ω) ≥ 퐼(푌 )
(resp. 퐼(푎1Ω) ≥ 퐼(푋)).
Indeed: assume for instance that 퐼(푋) ≥ 퐼(푌 ), then
퐼(푌 ) = 훼퐼(푌 ) + (1− 훼)퐼(푌 )
≤ 퐼(훼푋) + 퐼((1− 훼)푌 ) (푠푖푛푐푒 퐼(푋) ≥ 퐼(푌 ))
≤ −퐼(−훼푋) + 퐼((1− 훼)푌 ) (푠푖푛푐푒 푣(퐴) + 푣(퐴푐) ≤ 1 ∀퐴 푖푚푝푙푖푒푠 퐼(푋) ≤ −퐼(−푋) ∀푋)
≤ −퐼((1− 훼)푌 − 푎1Ω) + 퐼((1− 훼)푌 ) (푠푖푛푐푒 훼푋 + (1− 훼)푌 = 푎1Ω)
= 퐼(푎1Ω).
Therefore we see that,
푀푖푛(퐼(푋), 퐼(푌 )) ≤ 퐼(푎1Ω) = 푎
and since 푢 is increasing we conclude that
푀푖푛(푢(퐼(푋)), 푢(퐼(푌 ))) = 푢(푀푖푛(퐼(푋), 퐼(푌 ))) ≤ 푢(푎)
which together with (∗) proves that
퐼(푢(푌 )) ≤ 푢(푎) 푖.푒. 푎1Ω ≿ 푌.
★ We now show that (3) implies (1) (cf. Abouda and Chateauneuf [3] Theorem
3.8 (v) ⇒ (iii)):
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By contradiction: Suppose that there exists 퐴 in 풜 such that 푣(퐴) + 푣(퐴푐) > 1
(note that this implies 푣(퐴) > 0 and 푣(퐴푐) > 0).
Let 푎 ∈ ℝ, 휖 > 0, and set
푋휖 = (푎− 휖푣(퐴푐))1퐴 + (푎+ 휖푣(퐴))1퐴푐
and
푌휖 = (푎+ 휖푣(퐴
푐))1퐴 + (푎− 휖푣(퐴))1퐴푐 .
Note that
1
2
푋휖 +
1
2
푌휖 = 푎 (1퐴 + 1퐴푐) = 푎1Ω.
Since 푢 is increasing, 푢(푎− 휖푣(퐴푐)) ≤ 푢(푎+ 휖푣(퐴)), so that
퐼 (푢 (푋휖)) = (푢 (푎− 휖푣(퐴푐))) (1− 푣(퐴푐)) + 푢 (푎+ 휖푣(퐴)) 푣(퐴푐).
Also,
퐼(푢(푎)1Ω) = 푢(푎) = 푢(푎) (1− 푣(퐴푐)) + 푢(푎)푣(퐴푐).
Therefore,
퐼 (푢 (푋휖))−퐼(푢(푎)1Ω) = (1− 푣(퐴푐)) (푢 (푎− 휖푣(퐴푐))− 푢(푎))+푣(퐴푐) (푢 (푎+ 휖푣(퐴))− 푢(푎)) .
Now, a Taylor expansion of order 1 gives:
푢 (푎− 휖푣(퐴푐))− 푢(푎) = −휖푣(퐴푐)푢′(푎) + ∘(휖)
푢 (푎+ 휖푣(퐴))− 푢(푎) = 휖푣(퐴)푢′(푎) + ∘(휖)
From this we get
퐼 (푢 (푋휖))− 퐼(푢(푎)1Ω) = (1− 푣(퐴푐)) (−휖푣(퐴푐)푢′(푎)) + 푣(퐴푐) (휖푣(퐴)푢′(푎)) + ∘(휖)
= 휖 (푣(퐴푐)푢′(푎) (푣(퐴) + 푣(퐴푐)− 1)) + ∘(휖)
But, since 푣(퐴) + 푣(퐴푐) > 1, 푢′(푎) > 0 and 푣(퐴푐) > 0, there exists 휖1 > 0 with
퐼 (푢 (푋휖))− 퐼(푢(푎)1Ω) > 0 푖푓 휖 ∈ (0, 휖1] .
In the same way we obtain that
퐼 (푢 (푌휖))− 퐼(푢(푎)1Ω) > 0 푖푓 휖 ∈ (0, 휖2] 푓표푟 푠표푚푒 휖2 > 0.
So that, taking 휖 = 푚푖푛 (휖1, 휖2) , we obtain 푎1Ω ≺ 푋휖 and 푎1Ω ≺ 푌휖 which
contradicts perfect hedging.
★ We now turn to the proof of (2) implies (4) (cf. Chateauneuf and Tallon [6]
Theorem 3 (ii) ⇒ (i)):
Let 푋, 푌 ∈ ℬ∞ be comonotone and such that 푋 ∼ 푌 and let 훼 ∈ (0, 1).
We want to prove that 훼푋 + (1−훼)푌 ≿ 푌 i.e. 퐼(푢(훼푋 + (1−훼)푌 )) ≥ 퐼(푢(푌 )).
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This is easy, indeed:
퐼(푢(푌 )) = 훼퐼(푢(푌 )) + (1− 훼)퐼(푢(푌 ))
= 훼퐼(푢(푋)) + (1− 훼)퐼(푢(푌 )) (푠푖푛푐푒 푋 ∼ 푌 )
= 퐼(훼푢(푋) + (1− 훼)푢(푌 )) (푠푖푛푐푒 푢 푖푠 푖푛푐푟푒푎푠푖푛푔 푎푛푑 푠표 푝푟푒푠푒푟푣푒푠 푐표푚표푛표푡표푛푦)
≤ 퐼(푢(훼푋 + (1− 훼)푌 )) (푠푖푛푐푒 푢 푖푠 푐표푛푐푎푣푒.)
★ As for the proof that (4) implies (2), the proof given on ℝ++ by Chateauneuf
and Tallon for (i) ⇒ (ii) in Theorem 3 of [6] remains valid on ℝ.
⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 3.11:
★ (2) implies (1) (푎) :
Let 푋, 푌 ∈ ℬ∞ with 푋 ≿푠푚 푌, so that there exists 푍 ∈ ℬ∞ comonotone with 푋
such that 퐼(푍) = 퐼(−푍) and 푌 = 푋 + 푍.
We want to prove that 푋 ≿ 푌 i.e. 퐼(푢(푋)) ≥ 퐼(푢(푌 )).
1. Suppose that for all 푡 ∈ Ω, 푍(푡) ≥ 0.
If 푍(푡) > 0 then, since 푢 is concave, we have
푢(푋(푡) + 푍(푡))− 푢(푋(푡))
푍(푡)
≤ 푢′(푋(푡)) ≤푀 := 푠푢푝푥∈푋(Ω)푢′(푥).
푀 is finite since 푢′ is continuous and 푋 bounded. Also 푀 ≥ 0 since 푢′ ≥ 0.
So, 푢(푋(푡) + 푍(푡)) ≤ 푢(푋(푡)) +푀푍(푡) ∀푡 ∈ Ω such that 푍(푡) > 0.
This inequality is also obviously true for 푡 such that 푍(푡) = 0.
2. Suppose that for all 푡 ∈ Ω, 푍(푡) ≤ 0.
If 푍(푡) < 0 then, since 푢 is concave, we have
푢(푋(푡))− 푢(푋(푡) + 푍(푡))
−푍(푡) ≥ 푢
′(푋(푡)) ≥ 푚 := 푖푛푓푥∈푋(Ω)푢′(푥).
For the same reason as in 1., 0 ≤ 푚 < +∞.
So, 푢(푋(푡) + 푍(푡)) ≤ 푢(푋(푡)) +푚푍(푡) ∀푡 ∈ Ω such that 푍(푡) < 0.
This inequality is also obviously true for 푡 such that 푍(푡) = 0.
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3. Suppose that there exist 푠 and 푡 in Ω such that 푍(푠) < 0 and 푍(푡) > 0.
Since 푍 is comonotone with 푋, 푋(푡)−푋(푠) ≥ 0.
Furthermore, since 푢 is concave,
푢(푋(푡) + 푍(푡))− 푢(푋(푡))
푍(푡)
≤ 푢(푋(푠))− 푢(푋(푠) + 푍(푠))−푍(푠) (∗)
Now, let 푀 ′ = 푆푢푝퐹
{
푢(푋(푡)+푍(푡))−푢(푋(푡))
푍(푡)
}
where 퐹 = {푡 ∈ Ω ∣ 푍(푡) > 0} .
Clearly 푀 ′ ≥ 0 (since 푢 is increasing) and from (∗) we see that
푢(푋(푡) + 푍(푡))− 푢(푋(푡))
푍(푡)
≤푀 ′ ≤ 푢(푋(푠))− 푢(푋(푠) + 푍(푠))−푍(푠)
for 푍(푠) < 0 and 푍(푡) > 0. So that
푢(푋(푡) + 푍(푡)) ≤ 푢(푋(푡)) +푀 ′푍(푡) ∀푡 ∣ 푍(푡) > 0
푢(푋(푠) + 푍(푠)) ≤ 푢(푋(푠)) +푀 ′푍(푠) ∀푠 ∣ 푍(푠) < 0.
Obviously, the same inequality is also true if 푍(푠) = 0 or 푍(푡) = 0.
Therefore, in all cases, there exists an 푀 ≥ 0 such that
푢(푋 + 푍) ≤ 푢(푋) +푀푍.
Now, since 푣(퐴)+푣 (퐴푐) ≤ 1 for all 퐴 in 풜, 퐼(푍)+퐼(−푍) ≤ 0 (see Theorem
3.4) and since, by hypothesis, 퐼(푍) = 퐼(−푍), 퐼(푍) ≤ 0.
On the other hand, since 푌 = 푋 + 푍 and 푢(푋) is comonotone with 푀푍,
퐼(푢(푌 )) = 퐼(푢(푋 + 푍)) ≤ 퐼(푢(푋) +푀푍) = 퐼(푢(푋)) +푀퐼(푍)
Therefore, since 푀 ≥ 0 and 퐼(푍) ≤ 0,
퐼(푢(푌 )) ≤ 퐼(푢(푋)) 푖.푒. 푋 ≿ 푌.
★ (2) (푏) implies (1) (푏) :
Let 푋 = 푥11퐴푐 + 푥21퐴 and 푌 = 푦11퐵푐 + 푦21퐵 a binary SMPS of 푋, i.e. such
that 푦1 ≤ 푥1 ≤ 푥2 ≤ 푦2, 푣(퐴) = 푣(퐵) and
푥1(1− 푣(퐴)) + 푥2푣(퐴) = 푦1(1− 푣(퐵)) + 푦2푣(퐵).
In order to show that the DM is averse to binary SMPSs, we need to prove
that 푋 ≿ 푌 i.e. that 푑 := 퐼(푢(푋))− 퐼(푢(푌 )) is non-negative.
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From the expressions of 퐼(푢(푋)) and 퐼(푢(푌 )) :
퐼(푢(푋)) = 푢(푥1)(1− 푣(퐴)) + 푢(푥2)푣(퐴)
and
퐼(푢(푌 )) = 푢(푦1)(1− 푣(퐴)) + 푢(푦2)푣(퐴),
we get
푑 = (푢(푥1)− 푢(푦1))(1− 푣(퐴))− (푢(푦2)− 푢(푥2))푣(퐴).
We also have,
푥1(1− 푣(퐴)) + 푥2푣(퐴) = 푦1(1− 푣(퐴)) + 푦2푣(퐴)
i.e.
(푥1 − 푦1)(1− 푣(퐴)) = (푦2 − 푥2)푣(퐴) (∗).
-If 푣(퐴) = 0, then by (∗) 푥1 = 푦1 so that 푑 = 0.
-If 푣(퐴) = 1, then by (∗) 푥2 = 푦2 so that 푑 = 0.
-If 푣(퐴) ∈ (0, 1), then (푦2 − 푥2)(푦1 − 푥1) ∕= 0 and
푑 = (푢(푥1)− 푢(푦1))푣(퐴)
(
푦2 − 푥2
푥1 − 푦1
)
− (푢(푦2)− 푢(푥2))푣(퐴).
Therefore, since 푢 is concave,
푑
(푦2 − 푥2)푣(퐴) =
푢(푥1)− 푢(푦1)
푥1 − 푦1 −
푢(푦2)− 푢(푥2)
푦2 − 푥2 ≥ 0
and since (푦2 − 푥2)푣(퐴) > 0, we see that 푑 ≥ 0.
★ (1)(푎) implies (2)(푎) :
Let 푥 ∈ ℝ, 휖 > 0 and 퐴 ∈ 풜.
If 푣(퐴) = 1 and 푣(퐴푐) = 0, there is nothing to prove.
Otherwise 1 + 푣(퐴푐)− 푣(퐴) > 0 which we will assume from now on.
Let
푌휖 = (푥− 휖)1퐴 +
(
푥+
1 + 푣(퐴)− 푣(퐴푐)
1 + 푣(퐴푐)− 푣(퐴)휖
)
1퐴푐
and
푍휖 = −휖1퐴 + 1 + 푣(퐴)− 푣(퐴
푐)
1 + 푣(퐴푐)− 푣(퐴)휖1퐴푐 .
One readily checks that 푌휖 = 푥+푍휖 and 퐼 (푍휖) = 휖
(
푣(퐴푐)+푣(퐴)−1
1+푣(퐴푐)−푣(퐴)
)
= 퐼 (−푍휖) ,
which shows that 푥1Ω ≿푠푚 푌휖.
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Now, since the DM is SMUA, we conclude from this that 푥1Ω ≿ 푌휖 (i.e.
퐼 (푢 (푥1Ω)) ≥ 퐼(푢 (푌휖))). Together with the expression of 퐼(푢 (푌휖)) :
퐼(푢 (푌휖)) = 푢(푥− 휖) +
(
푢
(
푥+
1 + 푣(퐴)− 푣(퐴푐)
1 + 푣(퐴푐)− 푣(퐴)휖
)
− 푢(푥− 휖)
)
푣(퐴푐)
this gives
푢(푥)− 푢(푥− 휖)
휖
≥ 푣(퐴
푐)
휖
(
푢
(
푥+
1 + 푣(퐴)− 푣(퐴푐)
1 + 푣(퐴푐)− 푣(퐴)휖
)
− 푢(푥− 휖)
)
.
Performing a Taylor expansion we then obtain
푢′(푥) ≥ 2푢
′(푥)푣(퐴푐)
1 + 푣(퐴푐)− 푣(퐴)
and since 푢′(푥) > 0 by hypothesis, we conclude that 푣(퐴) + 푣(퐴푐) ≤ 1.
★ (1)(푏) implies (2)(푏) :
Let 퐴 ∈ 풜 such that 0 < 푣(퐴) < 1 and 푥1, 푥2 ∈ ℝ such that 푥1 ≤ 푥2. Setting
훼 = 푥1(1 − 푣(퐴)) + 푥2푣(퐴), one readily checks that 푋 := 푥11퐴푐 + 푥21퐴 is
a binary SMPS of 푌 := 훼1퐴푐 + 훼1퐴 and since the DM is averse to binary
SMPSs, 푌 ≿ 푋, that is
푢(푥1(1− 푣(퐴)) + 푥2푣(퐴)) ≥ 푢(푥1)(1− 푣(퐴)) + 푢(푥2)푣(퐴)
which, according to a result of Hardy, Littlewood and Polya (see Wakker [17]),
shows that 푢 is concave.
⊓⊔
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